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Blockbuster Inc. and the online DVD rental Industry

By Michael Moreton (UK)

August 2004 saw Blockbuster Inc. launch an online DVD rental service in the United States, this paper will look at the background behind that e-business initiative and will apply an e-business model to analyse the implication it had for Blockbuster1.

Footnote1. This paper looks at Blockbuster Inc. in the US market because (a) The US market is huge in volume, value and geographic spread – over 80% of Blockbusters revenues came from the US in 2003, (b) there are high barriers to entry for a national service and (c) there are few competitors to Blockbuster Inc.

Blockbuster Inc. was founded in 1985 in Texas in the United States as a local video-rental store. Over the next thirty years it grew to become the leading entertainment-related rental store in the world, with 2005 sales of over $5.9 billion in 26 countries (Blockbuster.com). Today it has a combination of company owned and franchised stores that rent and trade VHS, DVD and games, as well as sell snacks, drinks and other linked services.

Early 2004 Blockbuster was in troubled times:
(1) The rental industry was shrinking in value, with prices forced lower by the outright sales of DVD’s by retailers such as Wal-Mart.

(2) The company faced increased competition from other entertainment providers, Pay-Per-View films by cable channels – a market Blockbuster had already captured its share of, and from a successful start-up of an online rental service called NetFlix.

Blockbuster expanded its sale of DVD’s business – where it had just 3% of the market in 2003 (Forbes.com, 2003) - to combat the shrinking market value. The move to combat the threat of competing services is the focus of this paper and will be explored in more depth.

The largest competing service to Blockbuster was an internet-based firm called NetFlix. Its internet-based model directly challenged that of Blockbuster, with a different pricing and distribution strategy. In response, Blockbuster experimented with several business models, one resulted in Blockbuster announcing the end of its late fees. However such a move destroyed an important revenue stream - $250million for 2005 (Peers, 2005) - and not all the franchised stores operated the new policy.

In the meantime Blockbuster faced severe criticism by analysts who saw it slow to react to the new ‘NetFlix’ model, waiting for it to be proved and in the process allowing its major rival to take 95% of the online rental market (Stern, 2004). The online rental market, however, made up only a small percentage of the total industry - $280 million in 2003 (Arnfield, 2004). Blockbuster vice president Shane Evangelist pointed out “The reason the market is so small right now is that online movie rental is a new kind of business, and the service providers need to educate potential customers” (Newsfactor.com, 2004).

Following nine months of development with IT consultancy firm Accenture, in August 2004 Blockbuster launched its online service - Blockbuster Online. The service charged customers a monthly fee, and then customers were able to create an online list of DVD’s they wanted, whereby Blockbuster would then mail them out to the customer’s home via the postal service. When the customer finished with the DVD they popped it back into a prepaid envelope and mailed it back, before being sent the next DVD on their list. The new online service had its own head office, albeit a short distance from the main headquarters, so that operations were kept separate to the local stores company.

The decision to launch the e-business initiative can be analysed by using the ‘E-Business Opportunity Matrix’ by Tapscott.

E-Business Opportunity Matrix (Tapscott, 2000)

The online service would enhance the DVD rentals by adding greater accessibility for the customer by means of a 24hour website; it would also provide new e-Content for the customer, such as personalised wanted lists and user reviews. In all, the value added for the customer by the inter-networked technologies would be a greater customer experience through personalisation, convenience and greater access to DVD titles.

To critically analyse the move by Blockbuster, the E-Business Model Ontology proposed by Osteralder and Pigneur (2002) will be used. It uses four main components to create a business model; product innovation, customer relationship, infrastructure management, and financials.

E-Business Model Ontology (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2002)

Product Innovation
Blockbuster targets its online service to new DVD renters as well as existing in-store customers. With 100% brand awareness in the market (Gallup Organisation, Raven, 2002), Blockbuster has expanded its traditional brand by pointing consumers to the website. The new DVD renters have been reached through promotion by high traffic ‘content providers’ (Weill & Vitale, 2001) such as the AOL and MSN websites, the existing customers have been attracted by in-store advertising.

Cannibalisation – where Blockbuster transfers revenues from offline to online services rather than creating new revenues – is something Blockbuster has tried to avoid, as nearly half of the Blockbuster stores are owned by franchisees, not Blockbuster Inc. The issue has been addressed by cross-branding of the mortar and clicks operations through the use of coupons offered to online customers for use in stores. Looking to the future, as part of the e-business strategy and second stage of the Blockbuster Online implementation, Blockbuster intends to integrate its offline and online models completely. A spokeswoman for the company outlined the strategy “we think the real win-win will be a combination of an online and in-store service" (Forbes.com, 2003). At present a trial in San Francisco has combined the two models, with the national roll-out due sometime this year.

The online service creates value by offering the customer increased convenience so that they no longer need to visit the physical store. They can now use any internet connection to order titles and they pay no late fees. The redesigned B2C website enables customers to personalise their visit, allowing them to create their customised wanted list and prioritising it – the list is on-going and can be changed at anytime. Rare titles are able to be shipped in from other locations, and searching for specific titles is made easier for the customer. These add-on services to the core rental activity add value for the customer - Shane Evangelist, Blockbuster vice president “It's a matter of maximizing convenience and choice” (Newsfactor.com, 2004) - and the increased availability of the internet and the shorter postage times have established the infrastructure needed to operate the service.

Blockbuster has followed competitors into the market, and as such the service it currently provides is very similar. The e-business initiative behind the service has taken the ‘NetFlix’ model to start with, but Blockbuster has plans to go further and with the integration of offline and online services it offer greater convenience to the customer. Future issues of stock management will become important as the need for local stores to keep copies of titles for both postal send-outs and customers coming into the store.

Blockbuster already has critical mass in the rental market and holds the skills to be able to perform the core aspects of the rental service. It has formed partnerships with firms, as explained later, to learn the online side of the business and to promote the service and provide the background systems – stock management, website design and provide the logistics of the online service.

Infrastructure Management
Blockbuster Online will offer a unique product offering of integrated online rental service combined with the in-store service in the near future. At present it has its strong brand image and exposure in the market to attract consumers to its online operation - however at the same time the Blockbuster image of a physical rental store can also restrict the online service.

The creation of the online service was outsourced to IT consultants Accenture. Blockbuster internally did not have the essential knowledge of how to create an online operation, including a capable B2C website, however it did have IT employees that worked with Accenture on the service. Prior to Accenture, an undisclosed company was commissioned - it failed to bring adequate results and was replaced. The failure was costly to Blockbuster both in terms of cost, and of time-to-market of its online service. Blockbuster also suffered at the hands of investors, who saw little evidence that the company was taking any action to combat the online threat of competitors. After the humiliating failed partnership the Accenture one proved to be more of a success, taking just nine months to set-up the service with a team of 100 – drawn internally and from Accenture (CioInsight.com, 2005). Once established IT firm Infosys was contracted in to help train internally to perform the online side of the business, allowing Blockbuster to build up internal knowledge rather than to subcontract.

The initial investment of Blockbuster Online was huge in order to set-up new stock, warehousing and systems, including the new B2C website. The online service was kept separate to the offline service initially and 10 dedicated distribution centres opened with the ability to serve half the market with next day delivery. The figure hit 20 centres by January 2005, and 30 by June 2005 (Blockbuster.com) - in all $120 million was spent in 2005 building the online business (Peers, 2005). The further expansion plan to add the 4,500 local stores to the distribution network will cause more investment in the infrastructure of Blockbuster Online.

Another important partner for Blockbuster Online is the United States Postal Service. It is one of the key elements of the infrastructure, and thus is a venerable point for Blockbuster. To mitigate risk, Blockbuster Online has worked in conjunction with the USPS to develop a relationship, locating distribution centres near major USPS sorting offices.

Customer Relationship
Blockbuster Online uses sign-up information to target promotion to customers, such as TV advertising to certain age groups where service uptake is low, but rental usage (taken from in-store membership details) is high. Analysis is also completed on the title popularity, seasonality and other trends so that better forecasting can create better efficiency in the distribution network. A help for this also comes from the user wanted lists, as they give an indication of the films that need to be sent out to the customer in the future so allow the organisation of the distribution network to make that title available. Aggregated together the stock keeping is very complex but allows Blockbuster Online to better plan its stock and form a more accurate customer relationship.

Personalisation to the user allows them to create their own customer experience at the Blockbuster website. For Blockbuster this proves an information gathering activity so that relevant promotion or information can be sent back to the customer. Blockbuster Online can create a ‘Blockbuster recommends’ and ‘other users that rented this item also rented’ customised message for customers similar to that operated on the Amazon.com website.

Blockbuster Online uses the original Blockbuster brand, known by the market, to gain trust from its potential customer. An online community of customers is then created and the customers can exchange reviews and interact with each other. This is part of the Blockbuster Online brand extension to form a relationship with the customer, and it also provides a space for Blockbuster to promote its own products and services as well as external advertising.

Financials
The revenue model for Blockbuster Online is subscription-based. Each month payment is received regardless of the number of DVD’s mailed out to the customer. With the integration of in-store operations, there is a worry that revenue models and pricing structures will clash because at present Blockbuster stores operate a pay-as-you-go pricing structure. The diagram below shows that the subscription model provides more revenue up to a cross-over point where it is then better for Blockbuster to charge a pay-as-you-go revenue model.

Blockbuster Revenue Models

The worry of integration is that if not careful, Blockbuster may isolate one of the separate customer groups and risk losing them - not all customers will want to pay monthly to rent a DVD. Along with this the subscription-based model relies on card payments, and is inflexible to cash payments – something that the pay-as-you-go model is ideal for. Blockbuster could have offered one-off rentals to customers by using the pay-as-you-go model and card payments, but its other services – local stores and Pay-Per-View films – are better suited to that market. The subscription model is used for ease of use and to recover the vast sums of investment in the online infrastructure.

Since the start of Blockbuster Online in August 2004 the pricing strategies have changed several times. The service started at $19.99 but was lowered to $14.99 in December 2004 to increase service uptake. The price was then raised to $17.95 in August 2005, due to “enhanced value and service levels for consumers” (Blockbuster.com). Blockbuster has at all times, however, tried to undercut rival NetFlix. The fluctuating price has angered many customers, take for example comments on the DVD Rental Review website (dvdrr.com) that rate a satisfaction level of just 30% for the Blockbuster Online service.

A growth area for Blockbuster is selling advertising space on the envelopes for returning DVD’s. At present Blockbuster is experimenting with the idea, looking at using the space to promote its own services and selling it as advertising space. The space may be used by partners in exchange for promotion of the Blockbuster Online service – at no extra cost to Blockbuster.

The initial costs to set-up Blockbuster Online were substantial ($250million (Reuters.com)), with new systems, warehousing, personnel and extra (separate to offline) stock. The ongoing costs are reasonable – at $120 million for year 2005 – and once fully integrated Blockbuster will experience some economies of scale.

Unlike the revenue model, the cost model for the online service is dependant on the rate that customers change their rented DVD’s. The large part of the cost is postage, hence the more a customer returns back and requests a new DVD, the more postage costs incurred. Through the development with Accenture, Blockbuster was able to design a return envelope that accompanies the DVD title sent out to the customer so that it weighs in the lowest postage category - rival NetFlix patented its envelope but Blockbuster was able to develop its own separate design. With more sign-ups, the costs will, while the service is young, rise over-proportionally as more stock is needed and more distributions centres are built. In the long-run, however, the cost per sign-up will fall as the infrastructure is in place and there is only minimal extra cost attributed to extra customers.

The integration of offline and online cost models will be important, as the majority of cost for the offline operation is rent (as stores tend to be in prime locations), compared to postage for the online operation. Combined, the online operation has stock closer to the market – in local stores, therefore postage is at a reduced rate and some customers will come into the store to drop-off and pick-up.

Profits made by Blockbuster Online, are reinvested back into the service to increase the market coverage, increase the number of distribution centres and to invest in stock to satisfy demand. As part of increasing the distribution centres, profits are invested into the integration of the online system with Blockbuster stores, to offer customers greater convenience.

In conclusion the Blockbuster Online lost the first mover advantage in the online DVD market. Rival firms who started out as small niche businesses, like NetFlix, were able to expand into the mass market and take the dominating market share. In an industry with high barriers to entry – warehouses, systems, stock – this left Blockbuster many years behind.

Source: (Reuters.com, 2006)

However when in August 2004, Blockbuster entered the market, its e-business initiative went beyond that of rivals, using the model on a stages basis to merge with its offline model. With its established brand Blockbuster was able to aggressively attack the market, investing heavily in the infrastructure behind the service. However the size of the business, its image and resources were not necessarily a recipe for success as proved by the entry of Wal-Mart – the largest retailer in the world. It entered the online DVD rental market but several months later was forced to abandon its operations in favour of promoting NetFlix.

Solid revenue, cost and profit models showed that Blockbuster Online was able to claw back market share from competitors. However being behind, Blockbuster was yet to hit the trade-off period - as customer satisfaction improves (faster delivery times, quicker turn-around times, more stock) the profit margin decreases because of higher costs (new distribution centres, new systems and personnel and more DVD titles). Also because of the fixed revenue model yet variable cost model, there is a risk of negative profits. The fixed revenue model works on the basis that some customers will rent only a few DVD titles per month and yet will pay the monthly amount, thus Blockbuster will make a profit. On the other hand, some customers will rent many DVD titles per month, thus Blockbuster will lose money. The revenue model works on the basis that more customers will fall into the first category than the second. However a fall in the revenue model or an increase in the cost model will have the result of flipping this balance and hence the Blockbuster Online service may make a loss.

At a time when the rental market is becoming saturated, a time where the internet is becoming a more important part of life Blockbuster Online and the e-business initiative behind it is indeed satisfying its aim of increasing the convenience for the customer. The provision of added-on services has opened market channel opportunities for Blockbuster to expand its revenue streams.

As part of the overall corporate strategy, the e-business initiative has expanded the Blockbuster service level and revenue streams. The extent to which it succeeds will be seen in the future, when both offline and online operations are fully integrated, but Blockbuster Online is a solid base to start from.


References

Books & Articles

* E-Business Strategies Inc, (2002), Case Insight: NetFlix: Transforming the DVD Rental Business.

* Friesen. G., (2005), The More Things Change…The More They Stay The Same! Part Two, Consulting to Management, Burlingame, 06/2005, Volume 16, Issue 2, Page 25.

* Millman. G., (2005), Blockbuster’s Bricks and Clicks, Outlook Journal, 06/2005 available at http://www.accenture.com/Global/Research_and_Insights/Outlook/BlockbustersClicks.htm

* Osterwalder. A & Pigneur. Y., (2002), An e-Business Ontology for Modelling e-Business, 15th Bled Electronic Commerce Confederation, e-Reality: Constructing the e-Economy, Bled, Slovenia, 17/06/02.

* Pateli. A., (2002), A Domain Area Report on Business Models, White Paper, Version 1.3, 20/11/02, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece.

* Peers. M,. (2005), Video Poker: At Blockbuster, New Strategies Raise Tensions Over Board Seats; As Market Shrinks, Antioco Tries to Revitalize Business; Icahn Seeks Larger Payout; A Financier's Saturday Night, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), New York, 18/04/2005, Page 1.

* Stern. C., (2004), NetFlix Braces for Amazon, Washington Post 16/10/04 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36875-2004Oct15.html

* Tapscott. D. & Lowi. & Tico. D., (2000), Digital Capital – Harnessing the Power of Business Webs, Harvard Business School Press, Boston.

* Wasserman. T., (2005), Blockbuster to Hit Replay On Ads for Online Service, Brandweek, New York, 19/12/05, Volume 46, Issue 46, Page 14.

* Weill. P. & Vitale. M., (2001), Place to Space: Migrating to eBusiness Models, Harvard Business School Press, Boston.

Internet

* Anon, (2005), Blockbuster Online(TM) Enhances DVD Rental Service With Distribution Network Expansion and More Titles, PR Newswire, 07/06/05 http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/06-07-2005/0003821137&EDATE

* Annual Income Statement, Blockbuster Inc, Hoovers.com,
http://cobrands.hoovers.com/blockbuster/--ID__10218,period__A--/free-co-fin-income.xhtml

* Arnfield. R., (2004), Blockbuster Takes a Page from NetFlix, Newsfactor Magazine Online, 11/08/04 http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_title=Blockbuster-Takes-a-Page-from-NetFlix&story_id=26282

* Barlas. D., (2005), Death of a Blockbuster, Line56.com, 20/07/05
http://www.line56.com/articles/default.asp?ArticleID=6728

* Blockbuster Company Overview,
http://blockbuster.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=company_overview

* Blockbuster Fact Sheet, Hoovers.com,
http://cobrands.hoovers.com/global/cobrands/aolco/factsheet.xhtml?COID=10218

* Blockbuster Move Rental Store, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockbuster_(movie_rental_store)

* Blockbuster Press Releases, http://blockbuster.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases

* DVD Rental Review, http://www.dvdrr.com/

* Epstein. E., (2006), Hollywood’s New Zombie, Slate.com, http://www.slate.com/id/2133995/

* Keating. G., (2006), Blockbuster to push customers online, Reuters Online, 10/01/06 http://today.reuters.com/investing/FinanceArticle.aspx?type=businessNews&storyID=2006-01-11T020154Z_01_KWA107269_RTRUKOC_0_US-RETAIL-BLOCKBUSTER.xml

* Liedtke. M., (2005), NetFlix profit nearly doubles, raises earnings outlook, Post-Gazette Business, Pittsburgh, 26/07/05 http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05207/543530.stm

* Maloy. T., (2004), Blockbuster cast as ageing movie queen, Washington Times, United Press International, Washington DC, 28/10/04 http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041027-033928-5166r.htm

* NetFlix, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netflix

* Patsuris. P., (2003), Blockbuster Takes On New Strategy Vs. NetFlix, Forbes Online, 21/04/03
http://www.forbes.com/2003/04/21/cx_pp_0421bbi.html

* Patsuris. P., (2002), Blockbuster Must Switch Scripts, Forbes Online, 30/12/02
http://www.forbes.com/2002/12/30/cx_pp_1230blockbuster.html

* Rae-Dupree. J., (2005), Blockbuster: Movie Business Remains a Moving Target, CioInsight, 10/08/05, http://www.cioinsight.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=157500,00.asp

* Rentrak Press Release, (2005), Rentrak Reports One Billion DVD Units Rented in U.S. Home Video Rental Market During First Half 2005, Rentrak, 14/07/05
http://www.rentrak.com/mc_press_release?file=071405

* Smith. D., (2005), Hollywood Ending?, International Council of Shopping Centers, 09/2005
http://www.icsc.org/srch/sct/sct0905/retail_video_rental.php


Citation
Moreton. M., (2006), Blockbuster Inc. and the online DVD rental Industry, Lancaster University, UK.

 © Mike Moreton 2008. All Rights Reserved.

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